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Abstract
Right- and wrong-making features (“moral grounds”) are widely be-
lieved to play important normative roles, e.g. in morally apt or vir-
tuous motivation. This paper argues that moral grounds have been
systematically misidentified. Canonical statements of our moral the-
ories tend to summarize, rather than directly state, the full range of
moral grounds posited by the theory. Further work is required to “un-
pack” a theory’s criterion of rightness and identify the features that
are of ground-level moral significance. As a result, it is not actually
true that maximizing value is the fundamental right-making feature
even for maximizing consequentialists. Focusing on the simple exam-
ple of utilitarianism, I show how careful attention to the ground level
can drastically influence how we think about our moral theories.
Stocker (1976, 454) famously lamented the “moral schizophrenia”, or dishar-
mony “between one’s motives and one’s [normative] reasons,” that he associ-
ated with modern ethical theories. Our moral theories appear to furnish us
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with highly abstract fundamental justifications—invoking the likes of aggre-
gate utility, reasonable rejectability, universalizable maxims, or the balance
of prima facie duties. Ordinary moral motivation, by contrast, often involves
concern for particular, concrete individuals—and rightly so. This divergence
between justification and apt motivation is all the more striking because
many contemporary moral theorists explicitly endorse principles linking the
two. Others (especially consequentialists)1 have responded by disavowing
this link, effectively embracing the charge of schizophrenic disharmony. But
I think such disavowals are a mistake.
This paper offers a different kind of response to Stocker’s charge. We
can reject the assumption that our moral theories furnish us with highly
abstract fundamental justifications, normative reasons, or moral grounds.
Our theories may advert to highly abstract properties in specifying their
criteria for right action: that which fills in the blank in statements of the form,
“An act is right iff .” But we need not take those canonical criteria to
themselves be the theory’s fundamental moral grounds. Instead, I propose,
we should interpret them as summarizing the full range of moral grounds
posited by the theory. Highly abstract summary criteria are compatible with
appropriately concrete and personal ground-level concerns. Harmony may
thus be restored.
The central thesis of this paper is that the moral grounds (fundamental
right- and wrong-making features) posited by a theory can be more specific
than its general criteria for right or wrong action. What’s criterial for right-
ness need not be what most fundamentally makes an act right. This has
1 Cf. Railton (1984)’s “sophisticated” consequentialism, or most recently, Sharadin (2019).
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important normative implications, especially (but not only) for morally apt
or fitting motivation. As a result, our choice of moral grounds can make an
immense difference to the plausibility of our moral theories. Some powerful
objections to consequentialism, for example, depend upon the assumption
that maximizing value is the theory’s posited right-making feature. Under-
standing why this assumption is false also makes clear why these objections
fail. But it isn’t only consequentialists who can benefit from the distinctions
drawn in this paper. Moral theorists more generally would do well to ensure
that their theories assign ground-level significance to particular individuals
and their interests.
The structure of this paper is as follows: §1 explores the normative role of
moral grounds, drawing connections both to apt motivation and to the phe-
nomenon of wronging individuals. These connections raise what we might
call the Problem of Excessive Abstractness for ethical theories. §2 explicates
my central distinction between criterial and ground-level explanations of an
act’s moral status. This distinction is then put to work to provide theo-
rists with a powerful, harmony-preserving solution to the Problem of Exces-
sive Abstractness. Finally, §3 applies these lessons to dissolve ‘motive’ and
‘wronging’-based objections to consequentialism from the recent literature.
1 The Normative Role of Moral Grounds
This section explores the normative roles of moral grounds, and how these
give rise to the central problem that this paper seeks to address: the Problem
of Excessive Abstractness.
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1.1 Apt Motivation
Many philosophers now accept a link between virtuous motivation and the
concrete grounds in virtue of which a good act has its positive moral status.
For example, if donating to a certain charity is good because it helps the
global poor, then it’s natural to think that a donor ideally should be moved
by just this factor (rather than, say, a desire to show off their wealth). Such
moral grounds seem to be the proper objects of virtuous desires or morally
worthy motivation. As Smith (1996, 182) writes, “We normally assume that
[morally perfect] people are moved by the very features of their acts which
make them right.”2
This paper elucidates a neglected ambiguity in this view of Grounds as
Motivators, with important implications for our normative theorizing. To
clear the way for this, let me briefly indicate my reasons for setting aside
two alternative accounts of morally apt motivation: (1) ‘Moralism’, the view
that agents should typically be motivated by explicitly moral thoughts, e.g.
desiring to promote goodness, or to do one’s duty, as such; and (2) the ‘Global
Consequentialist’ view that agents should have whatever motivational profile
would be most useful, or bring about the best consequences (Pettit and Smith
2000).
2 Related theses are often formulated in terms of ‘reasons’ rather than ‘right-makers’,
e.g.: (1) Arpaly (2003, 72): “For an agent to be morally praiseworthy for doing the
right thing is for her to have done the right thing for the relevant moral reasons—that
is, the reasons for which she acts are identical to the reasons for which the action is
right.” (2) Markovits (2010, 230)’s Coincident Reasons Thesis: “an action [is] morally
worthy whenever the noninstrumental reasons for which it is performed coincide with the
noninstrumental reasons that morally justify its performance.” (3) Stratton-Lake (2011,
372), drawing on Korsgaard (1989), offers a similar Symmetry Thesis on which “morally
good people will tend to be motivated to do what they ought to do by the reasons why
they ought to do those acts.”
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The latter is arguably best understood not as a competing view at all,
but rather as addressing a different question. An agent may ask, “What
motivational profile would it be best or most desirable, from a moral per-
spective, for me to have?” I take this to be the sort of question driving
Global Consequentialists. This is to ask about the morally recommended or
fortunate motivational profile. By contrast, the question I’m interested in
is importantly different—something more along the lines of, “What motiva-
tional profile is most morally fitting or apt, reflecting an orientation toward
the good, and is on this basis perhaps worthy of praise or high esteem?”3
Note that there is no reason to expect the same answer to both questions,
as an internal orientation towards the good may have bad extrinsic effects.
For example, we may imagine that an evil demon threatens to destroy the
world unless you acquire (and subsequently maintain) the very same vicious,
morally contemptible motivations that drive the demon himself. He offers
a magic pill that will induce this effect in you. As a good person, you care
more about the world than about the purity of your own moral character,
and so—quite virtuously—opt to take the pill and become vicious.4 Your
subsequent motivational profile is, by design, morally contemptible. (We
may suppose that you come to intrinsically desire to corrupt the virtuous,
cause innocents to suffer, etc.) Nonetheless, it is highly morally fortunate
3 Note that to be worthy of praise is distinct from its being good to express praise, in the
same way that for a proposition to warrant belief (based on the evidence) is distinct from
its being good (perhaps for practical reasons) to assert.
4 This “virtuous viciousness” has the same general structure as Parfit (1984)’s “rational
irrationality”. See also Smith (1996, n.4 on p.182): “a morally perfect utilitarian, in this
ordinary sense, might none the less be morally required to cause himself to be less than
morally perfect; that only by becoming less than morally perfect in the ordinary sense can
he have the motivations his theory tells him he ought to have.”
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or desirable—though you no longer care that this is so—because your new-
found viciousness is causally responsible for saving the world from the evil
demon’s threat. So the moral aptness of one’s motivations cannot be iden-
tified with their desirability or usefulness from a moral point of view. Since
this paper concerns the former dimension of evaluation, we can put Global
Consequentialism aside.5
There are two major reasons to prefer Grounds as Motivators over Moral-
ism. The first appeals to intuitions about cases. Stocker (1976, 462) high-
lights how disturbing it would be to learn that a friend’s hospital visit was
motivated by a sense of abstract duty rather than friendly concern. Moralis-
tic motivation risks alienating agents from the grounded cares and concerns
that we ordinarily think are central to the good life. As Smith (1994, 75)
put it, “Good people care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe
of their children and friends, the well-being of their fellows, people getting
what they deserve, justice, equality, and the like, not just one thing: doing
what they believe to be right, where this is read de dicto and not de re.”6
The second reason is more theoretical, drawing on the conceptual equiv-
alence between something’s being good (or desirable) and its being apt to
desire (Chappell 2012). That is, it’s fitting to desire just those things that
are good or desirable. But the (pure) moralist fails to have these desires.
Instead of being moved by features that merit desire, they are moved by the
5 For more on how consequentialists should think about these two dimensions of evalua-
tion, see Chappell (2012).
6 See also the authors referenced in note 2, who treat Moralism as a primary foil and
argue against it at length—especially Arpaly (2003). Note that I take no stand here on
Smith’s broader argument, particularly the question whether motivational externalists are
committed to Moralism.
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higher-order property of desirability, i.e., the property of possessing other
features that merit desire. (This is akin to walking towards an arrow on a
sign instead of following the direction in which the arrow points.) Once we
see the structure for what it is, we can see that it would be more apt to be
motivated by those meritorious features, the concrete good-makers, rather
than by the higher-order property of possessing (other) meritorious features.
But that’s just to favour Grounds as Motivators over Moralism.7
I hope that these brief introductory remarks suffice to assure the reader
that Grounds as Motivators is (at least) a sufficiently well-motivated view
to be worth exploring in greater depth. There has been some pushback
against the idea that any degree of de dicto moral motivation is necessarily
“fetishistic”—see, e.g., Svavarsdottir (1999)—but I do not rely upon any such
extreme claim. I instead merely draw upon the moderate thesis that de re
moral motivation is a central component of the good person’s motivational
profile. (I think there’s a lot to be said for the hybrid view that it’s morally
ideal to be motivated by the right-making features in the recognition that
they make the act right, but it is not my task to defend this view here.)
7 For ease of exposition, I will sometimes slip between talk of features of actions and
features of the broader situation. As Doug Portmore noted to me, we ordinarily think that
what matters are things in the world (e.g., particular people) rather than mere features of
actions (even the “right-making” features). But I don’t think that this actually undermines
my assumption that an act’s right- and wrong-making features are moral grounds, because
an act’s feature of relating to the important things in certain ways (e.g., the feature of
causing harms or benefits to particular people) is obviously centrally relevant to there
being good reason, or motivation, for performing that act in particular.
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1.2 The Problem of Excessive Abstractness
We have thus far focused on the significance of moral grounds for determining
morally apt motivation. This is just one of the important normative roles
of moral grounds. Stratton-Lake (2011, 374) notes that they also “pick out
whom we have wronged when we wrong someone.” That is, in order for a
wrong action to have wronged a particular individual (giving them personal
grounds for resentment), that individual must feature in the explanation
of the act’s wrongness. Call this the Wronged Appear in Wrong-makers
principle. For example, victims are plausibly wronged when their rights are
violated, or when an agent fails in a duty that is owed to them in particular.
In such a case, the violation of the victim is central to explaining why the
act is wrong. Other kinds of wrong acts, by contrast, might be wrong merely
due to their (expected) effect on the global welfare, in which case plausibly
no one in particular is wronged by them.
We may further note that moral grounds appear, more generally, to be
the focus of our moral theorizing. That is, traditional moral theories are
typically in the business of attempting to identify those characteristics that
make an act right (Bales 1971), and axiological theories similarly attempt to
identify the features that make a state of affairs good. When utilitarians tell
us that “an act is right iff it maximizes utility,” for example, it’s very natural
to interpret this as saying that maximizing utility is what makes an act right,
and failing to do so is what makes an act wrong. This natural interpretative
step is based on the idea that Theories State Grounds.
If all this is correct, then we get some interesting results. For if you
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accept that Theories State Grounds, and you further accept Grounds as Mo-
tivators or the Wronged Appear in Wrong-makers principle, then you’re in
a position to “read off” rather more from the statement of a moral theory
than one might otherwise have thought possible. Specifically, you can read
off implications for virtuous motivation or for when people are wronged.
Consider, for example, the following argument:8
1. Grounds as Motivators: A virtuous person is moved to φ by the very
features of φ-ing that make it right for her to φ.
2. Theories State Grounds: A theory of the form “a subject’s φ-ing is
right iff her φ-ing has feature F” tells us that what makes it right for
her to φ is that φ-ing has feature F.
3. According to consequentialism, a subject’s φ-ing is right iff her φ-ing
would maximize value.
4. Therefore, consequentialism implies that a virtuous person is moved to
φ by the fact that her φ-ing would maximize value.
This seems a worrying conclusion: surely a virtuous person should care (non-
derivatively) about particular persons, rather than anything so abstract as
maximizing value!
Similar arguments could be presented against the familiar Kantian claim
that an action is wrong iff its associated maxim is not universalizable.9 Since
this statement makes no reference to particular individuals, it looks like the
8 Thanks to Doug Portmore for prompting me to make this explicit.
9 I take no stand here on whether this “familiar” Kantian claim is really true to Kant—cf.
Wood (2017).
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“real” victim of wrongdoing, for the Kantian who accepts Wronged Appear
in Wrong-makers, is something like abstract Reason rather than particular
persons. And we can use Grounds as Motivators to infer that a consistent
or “virtuous” Kantian would fundamentally care only about universalizabil-
ity, rather than caring non-derivatively about particular persons and their
distinctive interests.
So, some prominent moral theories appear to be in trouble here. To
label the issue, we might say that they suffer from an apparent Problem
of Excessive Abstractness. But appearances can be misleading. In what
follows, I argue that Theories State Grounds is subtly mistaken, in a way
that undermines the troubling arguments above.
My strategy here diverges significantly from the standard consequentialist
move of divorcing decision procedures from the criteria for right and wrong
action (Bales 1971; Railton 1984).10 Whereas I reject premise (2) of the above
argument, Railton and others implicitly reject (1). They address the Problem
of Excessive Abstractness through a kind of indirection, setting aside close
examination of the theory’s ultimate justifiers to instead invite whatever
contingent motivations would best serve to promote the good. This indi-
rection leaves those consequentialists vulnerable to Stocker (1976)’s charge
of disharmony between their motivating and normative reasons.11 I offer a
10 Of course, I’m happy to grant the basic distinction. I just think that the two can be
reconciled, or successfully bridged, by principles like Grounds as Motivators. Specifically,
such principles allow us to relate criteria of rightness to fitting motivations. It remains
an independent empirical question which motivations would be most instrumentally good
to possess in any given situation. So the deeper distinction here is not between criteria
of rightness and decision procedures, but between what’s fitting (in principle) and what’s
value-promoting (in practice).
11 Related objections to Railton’s sophisticated consequentialism are developed at length
in Chappell (2019a, sec. 3). The basic worry is the same that we raised against Global
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more harmonious solution, addressing the Problem of Excessive Abstract-
ness head-on by arguing that our theories’ ultimate justifiers need not be so
abstract in the first place.
2 Criterial and Ground-Level Explanations
This section argues that canonical statements of our moral theories may serve
to summarize, rather than directly present, the full range of moral grounds
posited by the theory in question. As a result, our moral theories are, as they
stand, surprisingly incomplete in presentation. More work must be done to
flesh out the full story about what right- and wrong-making features they
posit.
2.1 Introducing the Distinction
A simple way to bring out the challenge to Theories State Grounds is to
consider how it misfires when applied to the basic statement of Rossian de-
ontology: an act is wrong iff it violates the weighted balance of one’s prima
facie duties.12 It would seem mistaken to hold that the wrong-making feature
Consequentialism earlier: by substituting value-promoting motivations in place of apt
ones, these consequentialists risk changing the subject. Of course, it’s true that the value-
promoting motivations are the best ones to have, but that simply isn’t the same thing
as their being fitting, virtuous, or what we mean when talking about acting with “moral
worth” or for the “right reasons”. We may happily grant that promoting value matters
more, in practice, than the latter sort of normative status. Even so, as moral theorists we
should want to have an accurate account of this other kind of normative status. And that
requires us to look beyond mere value-promotion, even for consequentialists.
12 Ross (1930/2007, 41): “We may try to state first what (if anything) is the universal
nature of all acts that are right. . . . [R]ight acts can be distinguished from wrong acts
only as being those which, of all those possible for the agent in the circumstances, have
the greatest balance of prima facie rightness, in those respects in which they are prima
facie right, over their prima facie wrongness, in those respects in which they are prima
facie wrong.” Olsen (2014) argues on the basis of the quoted passage that Ross should be
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of one’s maleficent act, according to Rossianism, could only be the abstract
fact that it violated the weighted balance of one’s prima facie duties. We nor-
mally recognize that, for the Rossian, particular prima facie duties (read: pro
tanto moral reasons) contribute non-derivatively to the explanation of what
we ought to do. As Stratton-Lake (2011, 366) explains, the weighted balance
serves an important summary role in specifying “what is recommended”, but
it’s the particular things being balanced—the various moral reasons, or prima
facie duties, themselves—that do the real work, as “what recommends.”
This serves to highlight a general distinction between what we may call
the criterial and ground-level explanations of why some moral fact obtains. A
criterial explanation appeals to the (explanatorily relevant)13 necessary and
sufficient conditions for the truth of some moral claim, i.e., the conditions
that appear in place of the ‘X’ in theoretical accounts of the form, “An act
is right if and only if X.” If I randomly kick Joe in the shins, the wrongness
of my act can be explained criterially by the fact that my act has the general
property Y, which all wrong actions share. (Maybe Y is the property of failing
to maximize value, or maybe it is the property of violating the weighted
balance of prima facie duties.)
A ground-level explanation, by contrast, appeals to the particular features
understood as a generalist rather than a particularist. But even if one doubts this—say on
the grounds that we lack any sort of general formula for how to weigh the different prima
facie duties against each other—it’s hard to see why this should make any difference to
my subsequent arguments. Whether individuals are ever wronged, for example, cannot
plausibly depend upon imprecisely specifying the weightings of different prima facie duties.
13 There might be other criteria that are necessary and sufficient due to co-varying with
the genuinely explanatory criteria. For example, a theist who rejects Divine Command
Theory for Euthyphro-style reasons might regard the property of being approved of by God
as necessarily co-extensive with maximizing utility or whatever they take the independent
criterion of rightness to be.
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of the act which ground its having the moral status that it does, or that make
it right or wrong. So, for example, the ground-level explanation of my action’s
wrongness may consist in the fact that the act (gratuitously) harmed Joe.
My harming Joe is what makes it the case that my action meets the more
general criteria for wrongness, and is hence the fundamental wrong-making
feature of my action.14
Both criterial and ground-level explanations can serve as legitimate an-
swers to the question, “Why was that action wrong?” If the asker is won-
dering what makes actions in general wrong (when they are), and so hopes
to learn what generalizable property this wrong action shares with all other
wrong actions, then they are asking for the criterial explanation: “Because
it failed to maximize value.” On the other hand, if they are more interested
in the specifics of this particular action, how it came to meet these more
general criteria, or what the basic morally significant features of the situa-
tion were, then they are asking for the ground-level explanation: “Because
it (gratuitously) harmed Joe.”15
We need this distinction to make sense of the conceptual possibility of
various wrong acts being wrong for different reasons. All wrong acts share the
property criterial for wrongness (by definition). So if the criterial property
was the only eligible wrong-making property, it would seem to follow that
14 One might allow that there is a (derivative) sense in which the general criteria also
involve “wrong-makers”, since it is cogent to explain an act’s wrongness by appeal to its
possession of the criterial property. It simply isn’t the most basic or relevant explanation
for our purposes, as the fundamental grounds are what play the important normative roles
identified in section 1. Unless otherwise specified, in this paper when I speak of “right-”
and “wrong-making features”, I mean the ground-level ones.
15 I focus on a particular (token) action to make the distinction vivid, but the ground-level
explanation could also answer the question of what makes acts of that (suitably) specific
type wrong. Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting me to clarify this.
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all wrong acts were wrong for the same reason. Anyone disinclined to accept
the latter conclusion is thereby committed to holding that the ground-level
explanation of an act’s wrongness may be more specific or fine-grained than
the general criteria for wrongness. That way, two acts that equally meet the
general criteria for wrongness may nonetheless differ in what it is that makes
them wrong. We will see more concrete examples of this in the discussion to
follow.
2.2 Applying the Distinction
It’s not a trivial matter to discern which normatively significant properties
have ground-level normative significance. Note that the normative ground-
level need not be located at the “lowest” or most basic level of descriptive
reality (fundamental microphysics or the like). Normative grounds must
have the right kind of (non-derivative) normative significance, and a “higher-
level” property may well be more normatively significant than a descriptively
“lower-level” one. Consider a Divine Command Theorist who believes that
God contingently commands us to relieve suffering. While the property of
relieving suffering plays an important normative role on their view, its signif-
icance is entirely derivative. As a result, we do better to identify the property
of being commanded by God as their ground-level right-maker, or what does
the normative heavy-lifting. After all, the subjectively fitting moral moti-
vation for such an agent would seemingly be to have a basic desire to do
as God commands, and a merely derivative or instrumental desire to relieve
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suffering.16
This clarification brings out that it is a substantive normative question
what features have ground-level moral significance, or feature in ground-
level normative explanations. My view is that the normatively correct level
of specificity involves features like harming Joe (to a certain extent), rather
than either more specific features like hurting Joe’s left shin or more general
features such as harming a sentient being.
One way to test this is to ask whether it makes a normative difference how
the feature is realized. It makes no normative difference whether you hurt
Joe’s left shin or his right one, all else equal: either token act would be wrong
in just the same way—which is to say, they share the same wrong-making
feature (and should not be distinguished at the normative ground-level). But
it does make a normative difference whether you hurt Joe or Jane. Those
two harmful acts are wrong for importantly different reasons, we’re inclined
to think.
Our normative verdicts thus commit us to the view that harming Joe
and harming Jane are distinct wrong-makers.17 That’s why it would seem
16 At least, this is so on the simple ‘obedience’ interpretation of Divine Command Theory
(DCT) that I use here for illustration. Perhaps we could imagine a more sophisticated
view—a kind of ‘virtue-ethical’ interpretation of DCT—on which it’s instead fitting to
have concern for just those things that God himself has concern for. The striking differ-
ence between these two forms of DCT nicely illustrates the theoretical significance of the
normative ground-level, and how it can vary even while holding fixed the general criteria
for rightness.
17 To translate into the idiom of Chappell (2015), tradeoffs between distinct moral grounds
call for ambivalence, whereas truly normatively equivalent outcomes are fungible such that
any tradeoffs between them warrant outright indifference. It would be very odd to feel
terribly torn about whether Joe is to suffer a left-shin pain or a right-shin pain. That’s
a difference that clearly doesn’t matter. But it would be a deep moral error to similarly
disregard a tradeoff between Joe’s suffering and Jane’s. We should feel torn in the latter
case, because the separateness of persons means that this is a difference that matters.
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a mistake to attribute ground-level significance to a more general feature
like harming a sentient being. To explain the normative distinctness of the
two wrong acts—the sense in which they are wrong for importantly different
reasons—we must appeal to features of the situation that differ between the
two cases. But our cases of harming Joe vs. harming Jane may be alike in
all (normatively relevant) respects except for the identity of the victim. So
the normative ground-level must advert to particular persons: whether it is
Joe we hurt, or Jane. (Not that either person matters more than the other,
of course. The claim is just that they each matter, separately.)
Such specificity is also required to solve the Problem of Excessive Ab-
stractness, if we accept the normative roles for moral grounds set out in §1.
The “Problem” ultimately stems from our implicit commitment to avoiding
excessively abstract normative grounds, together with the presumption that
our moral theories cannot meet this commitment. I’ve now explained in
a different way why our ground-level explanations must be specific enough
to distinguish between persons. It remains to be seen whether our moral
theories can accommodate this need.
To answer this question, we need to know what constraints are imposed
by a theory’s criterial explanations, and so what ground-level explanations
remain compatible with any given theory’s criterial statements. To address
this, we may clarify the relationship between the two as follows: Criterial
explanations serve to (non-trivially) specify the general conditions under
which any more particular ground-level explanation will obtain.18 My (gra-
18 I add “non-trivially” to exclude “because it was wrong” from counting as a criterial
explanation of an act’s wrongness. I needn’t take a stand here on whether infinite dis-
junctions (i.e., of every possible particular wrong action across all possible worlds) should
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tuitously) harming Joe is the specific morally relevant feature in virtue of
which my action meets the general conditions for wrongness. These general
conditions for wrongness might have been met in different ways, say if my
kick had hurt Jane instead of Joe.19 There would then be a slightly different
wrong-making feature, or ground-level explanation of how my action came
to satisfy the general criteria for wrongness.20
This brings out that our ground-level wrong-makers must (at the very
least) contribute to the satisfaction of our general criteria for wrongness, and
so potentially explain why, in their specific context, the criteria were ulti-
mately met. Of course, the explanation here should be constitutive rather
than causal: if an evildoer saves one person as a means to killing five, his sav-
ing the one is not itself a wrong-making feature, though it causally explains
the obtaining of other features—the killings of the five—that are wrong-
similarly be disqualified. This further question addresses whether particularists—who deny
that any finite such generalities are available—are committed to denying that criterial ex-
planations are possible at all, or just that they aren’t useful, finitely specifiable, etc. The
former option probably makes more sense, however, as it seems that the putative “criterial
explanations” in the latter case would be incapable of doing any real explanatory work.
Put another way, “Because it was one of the following maximally specific possible actions:
A or B or C or . . . ad infinitum,” does not seem much of an answer to the question “Why
was this act wrong?”
19 That is to commit a different token wrong of the same general type. Of course, on
pluralist accounts, the criteria for wrongness might also be satisfied in a different type of
way—say, if I violated a prima facie duty of fidelity rather than of non-maleficence.
20 This distinction between the criterial and the ground-level is not unique to ethics. One
could similarly distinguish between the general criteria for being a sibling, and the par-
ticular individuals—my brothers—who make it the case that I am a sibling. But it’s
worth reiterating that the sort of grounding this paper is concerned with is distinctively
normative rather than metaphysical—cf. Fine (2012). So I don’t take my ‘ground-level
explanations’ or right-making features to settle the metaphysical nature of rightness, for
example. Rather, I mean to leave open that one could be a non-naturalist about norma-
tive properties, whilst allowing that natural properties serve as right- or wrong-making
features (or feature in ground-level normative explanations). For more on what non-
naturalists should say about the relation between rightness and right-making features, see
Chappell (2019b).
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making. Crucially, harms to individual persons are going to constitutively
contribute to meeting the criteria for wrongness on any plausible moral the-
ory. I’ll illustrate with two.
For Rossians, an agent’s harming Joe may constitutively explain why they
failed in their prima facie duty of non-maleficence, which may in turn be the
decisive factor for explaining why they failed to fulfil the weighted balance
of their prima facie duties in that situation. For consequentialists, the con-
nection is even more straightforward: since Joe’s welfare has intrinsic value,
harming Joe directly contributes to (and, given appropriate background con-
ditions, may constitutively explain)21 one’s failure to maximize value.
These theories are thus eligible to treat harming Joe as a ground-level
wrong-maker, and thereby absolve themselves of the Problem of Excessive
Abstractness. The resulting well-grounded theories are straightforwardly su-
perior to extensionally equivalent variants that settle for excessively abstract
moral grounds, for all the reasons explained above (and further developed
below, in §3). So interpretative charity recommends that we regard the well-
grounded variant of each theory as the default or canonical version of the
view.
2.3 Revisiting Grounds as Motivators
We’ve now established the central thesis of this paper: a theory’s moral
grounds may be much more specific than its criteria for rightness and wrong-
ness, allowing for a direct solution to the Problem of Excessive Abstractness
21 §2.4, below, explains why we don’t need to explicitly build all those background condi-
tions into the official “wrong-making feature.”
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that preserves harmony between our normative and (fitting) motivating rea-
sons. But it’s worth expanding upon how our distinction between the criterial
and ground levels can further illuminate our understanding of virtuous or apt
motivation.
Recall our observation (from §1) that the properly conscientious agent’s
concern for “morality” should be (at least in large part) de re rather than
purely de dicto in nature. That is, rather than just caring about “morality”
or “rightness” in the abstract, the morally conscientious agent cares about
the things that are of moral significance or the right-making features.22 It
would seem perverse, after all, to neglect the concrete things that matter in
favour of the abstract property of mattering (especially if one’s conception of
morality turns out to be terribly misguided: just think of the zealous enforcer
of unjust laws, e.g., Javert in Les Mise´rables).
In a similar fashion, I propose, it would be perverse to neglect what is
of ground-level moral significance in favour of what is merely criterial—i.e.,
a mere general guarantee that some or other feature of ground-level moral
significance obtains. Such a criterially motivated agent or ‘Criterial Moralist’
has taken one step towards concreteness over the bare Moralist that we began
with. The Criterial Moralist has more fleshed out moral motivations, in line
with the descriptive substance of their criterion of rightness (maximizing
happiness, or whatever it may be). But they have further yet to go. Our
general criteria of rightness can be further unpacked into particular morally
22 As per the terminological clarification in note 7, these are not the same thing. So it
would be more precise to say that the conscientious agent cares about the things that are
of moral significance, and so is moved to act by an act’s (right-making feature of) being
suitably related to those morally significant things.
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significant considerations, or ground-level reasons, and it is these that really
ought to move us.
To illustrate concretely: It is perverse for a wannabe Rossian to care only
about the balance of prima facie duties, rather than caring about avoiding
harm to Jane, and maintaining fidelity to Sally, and so forth. Such an agent
is criticizable on internal, Rossian grounds, for failing to care appropriately
about what (according to the most plausible interpretation of Rossianism)
has ground-level moral significance, namely the concrete contents of their
prima facie duties.
Analogous criticisms apply to the utilitarian who cares only about ag-
gregate utility and not particular people. Any plausible form of utilitarian-
ism must be token-pluralistic in its axiology, ascribing intrinsic value—and
hence ground-level significance—to each distinct individual’s welfare (Chap-
pell 2015). So an agent who fails to care about each particular person’s
welfare is thus failing to care about what, on this view, has ground-level
moral significance. The imagined perverse agent is thus not accurately ex-
emplifying the (most plausible) utilitarian perspective after all.
The distinction between ground-level and criterial explanations thus ex-
plains how it is that the putative Problem of Excessive Abstractness misfires.
Theories State Grounds misled us into thinking that a theory’s criteria for
rightness were also its fundamental right-making characteristics. We now
find that greater care is required to correctly identify (e.g.) utilitarianism’s
moral grounds. But once we do, the view can be combined with Grounds
as Motivators to yield plausible verdicts for apt motivation after all. That,
again, is the central upshot of this paper: a theory’s moral grounds may
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well be more specific than its general criteria of rightness, in a way that
significantly enhances the theory’s attractiveness.
Careful attention to the ground level can help us to better interpret other
moral theories too. We can now see that even Kantians should probably not
be motivated primarily by anything so abstract as the Formula of Univer-
sal Law, and Contractualists can aptly have more concrete moral concerns
than whether they are conforming to principles that no-one could reasonably
reject. In all cases, the abstract criteria of rightness offered by our moral
theories can be fleshed out to yield more concrete ground-level right-makers,
and it is these that (most plausibly) should typically motivate virtuous or
morally conscientious agents.
This suggests an important emendation to Markovits (2010, 230)’s Co-
incident Reasons Thesis that “an action [is] morally worthy whenever the
noninstrumental reasons for which it is performed coincide with the non-
instrumental reasons that morally justify its performance.” Without our
distinction between criterial and ground-level justifications, the Coincident
Reasons Thesis risks being too permissive, bestowing (full) moral worth upon
acts done from excessively abstract moral motivations. Whilst we might
grant some moral worth to such abstractly motivated actions (as being more
morally worthy than purely self-interested acts, for example), it seems that
acts are typically most morally worthy when the agent’s motivations coincide
with the ground-level justifiers. Something has gone wrong with the Crite-
rial Moralist who cares more about abstract principles than concrete people,
after all.
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2.4 Further Clarifications: Normative Grounds and Decisive Reasons
One may object to my identification of harming Joe as a possible wrong-
making feature on the grounds that this very feature could also be present in
an act that was permissible, say if harming Joe was necessary to prevent far
greater harms to Jane. Does this imply that the real wrong-maker for the
act must instead be some more general comparative property, e.g. harming
Joe when an alternative involving less net harm was available? I think not.
One option for addressing this concern would be to distinguish full vs.
partial grounds, and suggest that harming Joe is an instance of the latter.
Perhaps the full ground-level explanation of the act’s wrongness depends
upon all sorts of details of the situation, including facts about the various
different options available to the agent and how each of them compare to the
act of harming Joe. Still, the response goes, the harm to Joe is at least a
partial ground of the act’s wrongness, and perhaps that suffices to explain
why a virtuous agent would be motivated by this consideration.
My main concern with this response is that it doesn’t seem to give suf-
ficient centrality to Joe’s suffering. If it is just one partial ground amongst
many, could a virtuous agent just as well be motivated by concern for some
other partial ground instead? And wouldn’t it be most appropriate to be
motivated by the full grounding explanation, rather than just a part of it?
Perhaps it wouldn’t be terrible to hold that one should be motivated both
by concern for Joe and by a more general concern for the criterial moral
principles. But I would rather not be committed to this, and I’m especially
wary of any suggestion that the latter concern should be more fundamental
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than one’s (non-comparative) concern for Joe as an individual.
A better response, I think, harks back to the illuminating structure of
Rossian “prima facie duties” (really: pro tanto reasons). The prima facie
duty of non-maleficence means that we have a pro tanto reason not to harm
Joe. If this is not outweighed by any competing reasons, then harming Joe
will qualify as all-things-considered wrong: the prima facie duty becomes a
final duty. In such a case, what ground-level explanation should the Rossian
give of the act’s wrongness? One might, as above, appeal to both harming Joe
and the absence of any other reasons, which together suffice for wrongness.
But that response neglects the very different roles that the two considerations
are playing in the overall normative explanation. The harm to Joe consti-
tutes a normative reason against so acting. The absence fact is not itself
a normative reason at all, but instead tells us that there aren’t any further
reasons we need to consider. As such, the absence fact serves as an enabler
for turning a pro tanto wrong-maker into an all-things-considered one.
This brings out an important clarification to the notion of Grounds as
Motivators. The claim is not that virtuous agents should be motivated by
everything that plays some metaphysical role in determining the moral sta-
tus of an act. For, as we’ve seen, that could include higher-order facts about
reasons that are not themselves normative reasons at all. We should in-
stead insist that the relevant kinds of “moral grounds” are just the (decisive)
ground-level normative reasons. It’s a familiar fact that whether some nor-
mative reason is decisive is a contingent matter that depends upon how it
compares to the other reasons in the situation. But this in no way implies
that the only “real” normative reason is instead some more abstract com-
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parative fact, or indeed that the latter is any kind of reason at all.
(One might suggest, in light of all this, that the terminology of ‘right-’
and ‘wrong-makers’ is needlessly confusing or perhaps even misleading. It is,
perhaps, an unfortunate consequence of the way the literature developed in
response to Moralism that we have this terminology. I have no objection to
jettisoning this terminology and restating all the relevant theses directly in
terms of normative reasons—cf. note 2. Nothing of substance hangs on this
terminological choice. But if we do use the terminology of grounding to talk
about virtuous motivation, it is important to charitably interpret it in the
way I have suggested here. Otherwise the relevant normative theses have no
chance at all of being true.)
3 The Implications for Consequentialism
The previous sections set out some general lessons for our normative the-
orizing. This final section seeks to illustrate them by stepping through, in
greater detail, how consequentialists (especially utilitarians) can apply these
lessons to undermine ‘motive’ and ‘wronging’-based objections from the re-
cent literature. Along the way, we will clarify how to determine what’s of
ground-level significance for consequentialists.
3.1 The Motive Objection
Section 1.2 sketched the motive objection to consequentialism, offering it as
an example of the Problem of Excessive Abstractness. We may now flesh out
this specific objection with reference to Stratton-Lake (2011, 380)’s presenta-
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tion. He claims that, according to consequentialism, “[I]t is the fact that [an]
act has produced the best outcome, not the fact that it has produced a state
in which [various particular values are promoted], that makes it the right
act to do.” When combined with Grounds as Motivators (or Stratton-Lake’s
“symmetry thesis”, from p. 372, “that morally good people will tend to be
motivated to do what they ought to do by the reasons why they ought to
do those acts,”) we get the impalatable implication that, were consequential-
ism correct, morally good people would tend to be motivated by thoughts of
producing the best outcome.
While that might seem a reasonable enough motivation for certain (e.g.,
philanthropic) acts, it seems implausibly impersonal and alienated as an
account of everyday caring acts. To channel Williams (1981, 18), when a
man saves his wife, for example, “it might have been hoped. . . that his
motivating thought, fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his
wife, not that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is [not
suboptimal] to save one’s wife.”23
Crucially, this objection depends upon the assumption that the right-
maker for consequentialism is “produc[ing] the best outcome.” No argument
is offered in support of this claim; Stratton-Lake treats it as obvious, pre-
sumably on the basis of an implicit commitment to the idea that Theories
State Grounds. But once we distinguish the criterial from the ground level,
as we did in section 2, this assumption can no longer be taken for granted.
Theories state criteria, which may need further unpacking to reveal their ul-
23 The original Williams quote seemed to assume Moralism, attributing to the agent gra-
tuitous thoughts about permissibility.
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timate grounds. If the latter are sufficiently concrete and particular, so can
apt motivation be.
How, then, are we to identify a theory’s ground-level right-makers? The
general answer, I think, involves looking to the particular morally significant
components (or normative reasons) that explain how the general criteria for
rightness come to be satisfied in any given case. For act consequentialism,
the general criterion is producing the best outcome, and the components that
contribute to the satisfaction of this criterion are particular token values
(specified in the theory’s axiology). Consequentialists should presumably
hold that agents have pro tanto reason to φ just when φ-ing promotes some
token value. So their normative reasons for action are given by whatever (to-
ken) values are promotable in their particular circumstances. Ideally, these
reasons then become the agent’s motivating reasons, insofar as they are (in-
formed and) virtuous. So, if we believe that virtuous agents would be moved
by concern for particular individuals (and not just the general good), conse-
quentialists can accommodate this by adopting a token-pluralistic axiology
that specifies each individual’s welfare as a separate basic good. The motive
objection to consequentialism thus fails.24
24 That is, it fails as an objection to consequentialism in general ; specific axiologies may
still be subject to objections based on their implications for moral motivation. For exam-
ple, Stratton-Lake’s objection was directed at an “expanding the good” strategy which
sought (e.g.) to accommodate common intuitions about partiality by attributing intrinsic
value to sons helping their fathers. But even on my analysis, this putative value doesn’t
seem like it yields the desired motivations. We presumably want a son to be motivated to
help his father, not just to promote states of affairs in which sons help their fathers—as
though enabling two other sons to help their respective fathers would be preferable to
saving his own. So I agree that this variant of consequentialism does not seem a promising
way to accommodate common-sense partiality. (For that, you need agent-relative values.)
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3.2 Wronging Individuals
Can utilitarians account for the wronging of individuals? Nelson (2015, 717)
claims not: “According to utilitarianism, moral offenses are offenses against
global utility, right reason or the totality of sentient beings, but never against
individual victims.” Stratton-Lake (2011, 382) similarly claims, “the fact
that [an agent] has failed to bring about the best state of affairs leaves the
fact that his [victim] has been wronged completely unexplained. If anyone is
wronged here, it would be the world which has not been made as good as it
could have been. But that, of course, makes no sense.”
In either case, the underlying reasoning seems to depend upon some-
thing like the Wronged Appear in Wrong-makers principle, together with the
assumption that utilitarianism’s wrong-makers concern “global utility” and
never “individual victims”. Now that we’ve seen our way clear of the latter
assumption, the objection seems on shaky ground.
Utilitarians may, for example, hold that individuals are wronged by agents
who fail to give their interests due weight. Token-plural utilitarianism as-
cribes equal ground-level significance to each individual whose interests are
at stake in the situation. Neglect of such interests may play a central role in
explaining why some harmful act was wrong. In such a case, the agent’s lack
of due concern for their victim constitutes a targeted form of moral disre-
spect, directly analogous to (on the Rossian view) disregarding a prima facie
duty of non-maleficence.
To illustrate, consider three different ways that I might sub-optimally
(hence wrongly) harm you in order to benefit some other individual. (1) The
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benefit to the other person may not even outweigh the harm done to you;
in that case I have distinctively wronged you by acting in a way that fails
to give sufficient weight (equal consideration) to your interests. (2) Suppose
instead the benefit does outweigh the harm done to you, but I could have
benefited some third party even more. Then you have no special complaint;
I have adequately taken your interests into account (or at least acted in a
way that’s compatible with doing so), properly recognizing that they are
outweighed by the greater benefits I can (and do) give others. But I have
now distinctively wronged the third party whose interests have been unduly
neglected. (3) Suppose the extra “benefit” I forego was instead to a merely
possible person: I could have, but failed to, bring into existence a whole
new life that would have been a very happy, flourishing life. Then no-one
in particular is wronged. This is an instance of a purely impersonal wrong.
As the first two scenarios demonstrate, the utilitarian can easily account for
particular persons being wronged or offended against in appropriate cases.25
25 Some cases are less clear (but in a way that is not special to utilitarianism). Suppose I
harm both V and W in order to give a benefit to some third party that is greater than either
harm in isolation, but much less than both harms combined. Our account of Wronging
as Undervaluing suggests that we do not yet have enough information to know who my
action wrongs. Absent any basis for differentiation, it’s most natural to assume that I
undervalue (and hence wrong) both V and W. But suppose that isn’t the case. Suppose I
fully respect V, and wouldn’t impose a larger harm on her for a smaller benefit to anyone
else; it’s just that I don’t give W’s interests any weight whatsoever, and so (wrongly)
consider the combined harms to V + W to be of no greater importance than the harm to
V alone. In such a case, I’m inclined to think that V has no reason to resent me for acting
as I do (whereas W certainly does), so only W is wronged.
Note that Rossian deontologists face analogous cases where a single prima facie duty
of non-maleficence would not suffice to make an act wrong, but two together do, and
the agent acts wrongly because they ignore (or underweight) just one of these two prima
facie duties. Again, I’m inclined to think that the correct answer for the Rossian is to
hold that only the subject of the neglected prima facie duty is wronged. But anyone who
prefers a different solution in the Rossian case (e.g., holding that both are wronged even
though it would have been permissible to harm the one had it not been for the second)
will presumably find a corresponding response available to the utilitarian.
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Conclusion
The distinction between criterial and ground-level features undermines the
assumption that Theories State Grounds, requiring us to rethink how we
identify a theory’s right-making features and other moral grounds. We may
still retain the background thought that specifying moral grounds is a cen-
tral task for our moral theorizing. It is simply one that goes beyond the
more familiar task of specifying the general criteria for rightness. Moral the-
orists thus have more work to do than previously appreciated, as a theory
remains incomplete if it merely provides us with a summary criterion without
specifying which features are of ground-level significance. We’ve seen that
it makes a significant difference to the plausibility of utilitarianism, for ex-
ample, whether aggregate welfare or individual welfare occupies the ground
level. By adopting the latter view, utilitarians can avoid the Problem of Ex-
cessive Abstractness, securing plausible implications for virtuous motivation
(while accepting Grounds as Motivators) and accounting for the wronging of
individuals (while accepting Wronged Appear in Wrong-makers). Developing
plausible specifications of the ground level for Kantian, contractualist, and
other moral theories is a task for future research.
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